Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2190
  #_index: "academ_contributions"
  #_id: "550"
  #_source: array:26 [
    "id" => "550"
    "slug" => "a-matching-model-of-the-academic-publication-market"
    "yearMonth" => "2011-12"
    "year" => "2011"
    "title" => "A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market"
    "description" => "BESANCENOT, D., HUYNH, K. et VRANCEANU, R. (2011). A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i>, 167(4), pp. 708-725."
    "authors" => array:3 [
      0 => array:3 [
        "name" => "VRANCEANU Radu"
        "bid" => "B00000524"
        "slug" => "vranceanu-radu"
      ]
      1 => array:1 [
        "name" => "BESANCENOT D."
      ]
      2 => array:1 [
        "name" => "HUYNH K."
      ]
    ]
    "ouvrage" => ""
    "keywords" => array:4 [
      0 => "Appariement"
      1 => "Éditeur"
      2 => "Information imparfaite"
      3 => "Publications académiques"
    ]
    "updatedAt" => "2021-02-02 16:16:18"
    "publicationUrl" => "https://www.jstor.org/stable/41474931"
    "publicationInfo" => array:3 [
      "pages" => "708-725"
      "volume" => "167"
      "number" => "4"
    ]
    "type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Articles"
      "en" => "Journal articles"
    ]
    "support_type" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Revue scientifique"
      "en" => "Scientific journal"
    ]
    "countries" => array:2 [
      "fr" => null
      "en" => null
    ]
    "abstract" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "L'article proposé un modèle d'appariement pour décrire le fonctionnement du marché des publications académiques. Nous étudions la détermination des frais de soumission d'articles, la tension sur le marché et le taux de rejets d'articles."
      "en" => "This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals' editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is defined as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors."
    ]
    "authors_fields" => array:2 [
      "fr" => "Economie"
      "en" => "Economics"
    ]
    "indexedAt" => "2024-04-20T02:21:47.000Z"
    "docTitle" => "A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market"
    "docSurtitle" => "Journal articles"
    "authorNames" => "<a href="/cv/vranceanu-radu">VRANCEANU Radu</a>, BESANCENOT D., HUYNH K."
    "docDescription" => "<span class="document-property-authors">VRANCEANU Radu, BESANCENOT D., HUYNH K.</span><br><span class="document-property-authors_fields">Economics</span> | <span class="document-property-year">2011</span>"
    "keywordList" => "<a href="#">Appariement</a>, <a href="#">Éditeur</a>, <a href="#">Information imparfaite</a>, <a href="#">Publications académiques</a>"
    "docPreview" => "<b>A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market</b><br><span>2011-12 | Journal articles </span>"
    "docType" => "research"
    "publicationLink" => "<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41474931" target="_blank">A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market</a>"
  ]
  +lang: "en"
  +"_type": "_doc"
  +"_score": 8.727519
  +"parent": null
}