Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205
#_id: "B00791770"
#_source: array:39 [
"bid" => "B00791770"
"academId" => "30412"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
"fullName" => "Xavier LAMBIN"
"lastName" => "LAMBIN"
"firstName" => "Xavier"
"title" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur assistant"
"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"email" => "xavier.lambin@essec.edu"
"status" => "ACTIF"
"campus" => "Campus de Cergy"
"departments" => []
"phone" => "0134433732"
"sites" => []
"facNumber" => "30412"
"externalCvUrl" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/cv/lambin-xavier/pdf"
"googleScholarUrl" => "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rvaYU_UAAAAJ&hl=fr"
"facOrcId" => "https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4664-726X"
"career" => array:4 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2208
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2021-09-01"
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"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Positions académiques principales"
"en" => "Full-time academic appointments"
]
"label" => array:2 [
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"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ESSEC Business School"
"en" => "ESSEC Business School"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2211
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2021-08-31"
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"type" => array:2 [
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Professeur assistant"
"en" => "Assistant Professor"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Grenoble École de Management"
"en" => "Grenoble École de Management"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2212
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2015-01-01"
"endDate" => "2017-12-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Professional appointments"
"fr" => "Positions professionnelles"
]
"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Analyst"
"en" => "Analyst"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "ENGIE"
"en" => "ENGIE"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\CareerItem {#2213
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:7 [
"startDate" => "2011-09-01"
"endDate" => "2013-08-31"
"isInternalPosition" => true
"type" => array:2 [
"en" => "Professional appointments"
"fr" => "Positions professionnelles"
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"label" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Sr analyst"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "IHS Markit"
"en" => "IHS Markit"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Royaume-Uni"
"en" => "United Kingdom"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
]
"diplomes" => array:5 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2207
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2019"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Economy, Economics"
"fr" => "Doctor of Philosophy, Economie, Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Toulouse School of Economics"
"en" => "Toulouse School of Economics"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2209
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
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"year" => "2011"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Master of Engineering, Engineering"
"fr" => "Ecole d'ingénieur, Ingénierie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "École Polytechnique"
"en" => "École Polytechnique"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2206
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
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"fr" => "Diplômes"
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"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Master of Engineering, Mathematics"
"fr" => "Ecole d'ingénieur, Mathématiques"
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"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Mines ParisTech"
"en" => "Mines ParisTech"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2210
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
]
"year" => "2014"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Master of Science, Economics"
"fr" => "Master of Science, Economie"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Toulouse School of Economics"
"en" => "Toulouse School of Economics"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Diplome {#2204
#_index: null
#_id: null
#_source: array:6 [
"diplome" => "DIPLOMA"
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Diplômes"
"en" => "Diplomas"
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"year" => "2011"
"label" => array:2 [
"en" => "Maîtrise, Political Philosophy and Ethics"
"fr" => "Maîtrise, Philosophie Politique et Ethique"
]
"institution" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Université Paris IV Sorbonne"
"en" => "Université Paris IV Sorbonne"
]
"country" => array:2 [
"fr" => "France"
"en" => "France"
]
]
+lang: "fr"
+"parent": Essec\Faculty\Model\Profile {#2205}
}
]
"bio" => array:2 [
"fr" => "<p><span style="color:rgb(32, 31, 31)">Xavier Lambin est ingénieur diplômé de l’École Polytechnique et de l’École des Mines. Après deux ans de conseil en stratégie, il effectue un doctorat en Économie Industrielle à la Toulouse School of Economics. Il est ensuite assistant professeur à Grenoble Ecole de Management, avant de rejoindre l'ESSEC en 2021. Sa recherche porte sur l’économie du numérique et l’architecture des marchés de l’électricité. Les techniques utilisées sont aussi bien théoriques qu’empiriques.</span></p>"
"en" => "<p>Xavier Lambin is an engineer from École Polytechnique and École des Mines. After two years of strategy consulting, he completed a PhD in Industrial Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics. He then became an assistant professor at Grenoble Ecole de Management, before joining ESSEC in 2021. His research focuses on market design for the digital economy and electricity markets. His techniques are both theoretical and empirical.</p>"
]
"department" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"site" => array:2 [
"fr" => "https://sites.google.com/view/xavierlambin/home"
"en" => "https://sites.google.com/view/xavierlambin/home"
]
"industrrySectors" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"researchFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie industrielle"
"en" => "Industrial Economics"
]
"teachingFields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie industrielle"
"en" => "Industrial Economics"
]
"distinctions" => []
"teaching" => []
"otherActivities" => []
"theses" => []
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:27.000Z"
"contributions" => array:13 [
0 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2215
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12472"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12472"
"slug" => "on-the-viability-of-energy-communities"
"yearMonth" => "2020-08"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "On the Viability of Energy Communities"
"description" => "ABADA, I., EHRENMANN, A. et XAVIER LAMBIN, X.L. (2020). On the Viability of Energy Communities. <i>Energy Journal</i>, 41(1)."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "XAVIER LAMBIN Xavier LAMBIN"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ABADA Ibrahim"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "EHRENMANN Andreas"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Energy communities"
1 => "Cooperative game theory"
2 => "Decentralized power production"
3 => "Consumer participation"
4 => "Micro-grids"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "41"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Following the development of decentralized production technologies, energy communities have become a topic of increased interest. While the potential benefits have been described, we use the framework of cooperative game theory to test the ability of such communities to adequately share the gains. Indeed, despite the potential value created by such coalitions, there is no guarantee that they will be viable: a subset of participants may find it profitable to exit the community and create another one of their own."
"en" => "Following the development of decentralized production technologies, energy communities have become a topic of increased interest. While the potential benefits have been described, we use the framework of cooperative game theory to test the ability of such communities to adequately share the gains. Indeed, despite the potential value created by such coalitions, there is no guarantee that they will be viable: a subset of participants may find it profitable to exit the community and create another one of their own."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
1 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2217
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12473"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12473"
"slug" => "unintended-consequences-the-snowball-effect-of-energy-communities"
"yearMonth" => "2020-08"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities"
"description" => "ABADA, I., EHRENMANN, A. et XAVIER LAMBIN, X.L. (2020). Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities. <i>Energy Policy</i>, 143, pp. 111597."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "XAVIER LAMBIN Xavier LAMBIN"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ABADA Ibrahim"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "EHRENMANN Andreas"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Energy communities"
1 => "Cooperative game theory"
2 => "Non-cooperative game theory"
3 => "Decentralized power production"
4 => "Consumer participation"
5 => "Micro-grids"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111597"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "111597"
"volume" => "143"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "In 2019, the European Commission finalized a legal framework for “Citizens” and “Renewable Energy Communities”, paving the way for their deployment. While the benefits of such communities have been discussed, there is increasing concern that inadequate grid tariffs may lead to excess adoption of such business models. Furthermore, snowball effects may be observed following the effects these communities have on grid tariffs. We show that restraining the study to a simple financial analysis is far from satisfactory."
"en" => "In 2019, the European Commission finalized a legal framework for “Citizens” and “Renewable Energy Communities”, paving the way for their deployment. While the benefits of such communities have been discussed, there is increasing concern that inadequate grid tariffs may lead to excess adoption of such business models. Furthermore, snowball effects may be observed following the effects these communities have on grid tariffs. We show that restraining the study to a simple financial analysis is far from satisfactory."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
2 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2219
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12484"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12484"
"slug" => "integration-of-demand-response-in-electricity-market-capacity-mechanisms"
"yearMonth" => "2020-06"
"year" => "2020"
"title" => "Integration of Demand Response in Electricity Market Capacity Mechanisms"
"description" => "XAVIER LAMBIN, X.L. (2020). Integration of Demand Response in Electricity Market Capacity Mechanisms. <i>Utilities Policy</i>, 64, pp. 101033."
"authors" => array:1 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "XAVIER LAMBIN Xavier LAMBIN"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:3 [
0 => "Demand response"
1 => "Capacity remuneration mechanisms"
2 => "Power market design"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2020.101033"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "101033"
"volume" => "64"
"number" => null
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Ensuring that the power system meets demand peaks is a key challenge of liberalized markets. On the supply side, capacity can be supported through a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). On the demand side, Demand Response (DR) technologies can be deployed. We find that while all traditional generation should receive the same payment, capacity payments for DR technologies should gradually decrease based on operators’ position in the load-shedding order. We observe that all CRM schemes currently implemented provide inadequate incentives to non-price responsive DR and propose to adjust payments to DR units as a function of their expected activation periods."
"en" => "Ensuring that the power system meets demand peaks is a key challenge of liberalized markets. On the supply side, capacity can be supported through a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). On the demand side, Demand Response (DR) technologies can be deployed. We find that while all traditional generation should receive the same payment, capacity payments for DR technologies should gradually decrease based on operators’ position in the load-shedding order. We observe that all CRM schemes currently implemented provide inadequate incentives to non-price responsive DR and propose to adjust payments to DR units as a function of their expected activation periods."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
3 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2216
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12485"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12485"
"slug" => "cross-border-effects-of-capacity-remuneration-schemes-in-interconnected-markets-who-is-free-riding"
"yearMonth" => "2019-03"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Cross-border Effects of Capacity Remuneration Schemes in Interconnected Markets: Who is Free-riding?"
"description" => "XAVIER LAMBIN, X.L. et LÉAUTIER, T.O. (2019). Cross-border Effects of Capacity Remuneration Schemes in Interconnected Markets: Who is Free-riding? <i>Energy Journal</i>, 40(6)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "XAVIER LAMBIN Xavier LAMBIN"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "LÉAUTIER Thomas-Olivier"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=3428"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "40"
"number" => "6"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We study the welfare impacts of domestic support schemes for generation capacity when energy markets are interconnected. We find that if transmission system operators (TSOs) can't reduce export capacity and neighbors stay energy-only, a capacity market is ineffective unless transmission capacity is small. If TSOs can reduce export capacity, the capacity market attracts investments and Security of Supply (SoS) of non-domestic markets shrink. A neighboring energy-only or strategic reserve market will thus be prejudiced in the long-run and may have to implement a capacity market as well in order to meet its SoS standard. Hence, capacity markets may spread in Europe thanks to their negative cross-border effect on investment incentives. This is in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom, based on short-term arguments, that energy-only markets will free-ride the SoS provided by neighboring capacity markets. Our conclusions urge for the harmonization of capacity remuneration schemes across Europe."
"en" => "We study the welfare impacts of domestic support schemes for generation capacity when energy markets are interconnected. We find that if transmission system operators (TSOs) can't reduce export capacity and neighbors stay energy-only, a capacity market is ineffective unless transmission capacity is small. If TSOs can reduce export capacity, the capacity market attracts investments and Security of Supply (SoS) of non-domestic markets shrink. A neighboring energy-only or strategic reserve market will thus be prejudiced in the long-run and may have to implement a capacity market as well in order to meet its SoS standard. Hence, capacity markets may spread in Europe thanks to their negative cross-border effect on investment incentives. This is in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom, based on short-term arguments, that energy-only markets will free-ride the SoS provided by neighboring capacity markets. Our conclusions urge for the harmonization of capacity remuneration schemes across Europe."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
4 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2220
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12486"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12486"
"slug" => "ensuring-capacity-adequacy-in-liberalised-electricity-markets"
"yearMonth" => "2019-02"
"year" => "2019"
"title" => "Ensuring Capacity Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets"
"description" => "ASTIER, N. et XAVIER LAMBIN, X.L. (2019). Ensuring Capacity Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets. <i>Energy Journal</i>, 40(3)."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "XAVIER LAMBIN Xavier LAMBIN"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ASTIER Nicolas"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:5 [
0 => "Liberalised electricity markets"
1 => "Capacity adequacy"
2 => "Capacity remuneration mechanisms"
3 => "Demand response"
4 => "Electricity market design"
]
"updatedAt" => "2021-09-24 10:33:27"
"publicationUrl" => "http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=3360"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => null
"volume" => "40"
"number" => "3"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "This paper studies wholesale electricity markets where an exogenous price cap is enforced, compromising both short- and long-term incentives. To guarantee capacity adequacy, policy-makers may provide support for generation through a capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM) and/or encourage demand response (DR). Such mechanisms are formalised within a common simple analytical framework, clarifying how these mechanisms relate to each other. We then divide them into two categories, depending on whether their implementation requires transactions to be made based explicitly on spot prices higher than the price cap. While mechanisms that keep implicit these high marginal costs are likely to be preferred from a political perspective, they also appear to be less efficient. If they are to be implemented nonetheless, we suggest that the price cap should be set higher than the marginal cost of the most expensive plant, and highlight that challenges for demand-response integration in CRMs remain."
"en" => "This paper studies wholesale electricity markets where an exogenous price cap is enforced, compromising both short- and long-term incentives. To guarantee capacity adequacy, policy-makers may provide support for generation through a capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM) and/or encourage demand response (DR). Such mechanisms are formalised within a common simple analytical framework, clarifying how these mechanisms relate to each other. We then divide them into two categories, depending on whether their implementation requires transactions to be made based explicitly on spot prices higher than the price cap. While mechanisms that keep implicit these high marginal costs are likely to be preferred from a political perspective, they also appear to be less efficient. If they are to be implemented nonetheless, we suggest that the price cap should be set higher than the marginal cost of the most expensive plant, and highlight that challenges for demand-response integration in CRMs remain."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
5 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2214
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12835"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12835"
"slug" => "the-energy-efficiency-gap-in-the-rental-housing-market-it-takes-both-sides-to-build-a-bridge"
"yearMonth" => "2023-01"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "The Energy Efficiency Gap in the Rental Housing Market: It Takes Both Sides to Build a Bridge"
"description" => "LAMBIN, X., SCHLEICH, J. et FAURE, C. (2023). The Energy Efficiency Gap in the Rental Housing Market: It Takes Both Sides to Build a Bridge. <i>Energy Journal</i>, 44(1), pp. 43-61."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "SCHLEICH Joachim"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "FAURE Corinne"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Energy efficiency gap"
1 => "Split incentives"
2 => "Rental housing market"
3 => "Matching"
4 => "Signaling"
5 => "Energy performance certificates"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-03-06 11:32:31"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=3929"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "43-61"
"volume" => "44"
"number" => "1"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "We revisit the issue of the energy efficiency (EE) gap by explicitly acknowledging the two-sided nature of the rental housing market and two-sided asymmetries of information between tenants and landlords. Employing a theoretical matching model, we show that Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) that signal a dwelling’s energy performance induce optimal EE investments by landlords only if tenants pay their energy expenditures in full. When landlords pay part of the energy expenditures, they seek tenants who will conserve energy. Our model shows that asymmetry of information over tenant characteristics results in suboptimally low investments in EE. This may even render EPCs counterproductive. As a remedy, we show that tenant-side signaling needs to be rolled out jointly with EPCs and may even be sufficient when contracts include energy expenditures. Data from an original survey provides support for these insights and suggests that information on the tenants’ side contributes to more EE investment."
"en" => "We revisit the issue of the energy efficiency (EE) gap by explicitly acknowledging the two-sided nature of the rental housing market and two-sided asymmetries of information between tenants and landlords. Employing a theoretical matching model, we show that Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) that signal a dwelling’s energy performance induce optimal EE investments by landlords only if tenants pay their energy expenditures in full. When landlords pay part of the energy expenditures, they seek tenants who will conserve energy. Our model shows that asymmetry of information over tenant characteristics results in suboptimally low investments in EE. This may even render EPCs counterproductive. As a remedy, we show that tenant-side signaling needs to be rolled out jointly with EPCs and may even be sufficient when contracts include energy expenditures. Data from an original survey provides support for these insights and suggests that information on the tenants’ side contributes to more EE investment."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
6 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2218
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "12902"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "12902"
"slug" => "the-role-of-prior-warnings-when-cheating-is-easy-and-punishment-is-credible"
"yearMonth" => "2022-03"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "The role of prior warnings when cheating is easy and punishment is credible"
"description" => "HUMBERT, M., LAMBIN, X. et VILLARD, E. (2022). The role of prior warnings when cheating is easy and punishment is credible. <i>Information Economics and Policy</i>, 58, pp. 100959."
"authors" => array:3 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUMBERT Marc"
]
2 => array:1 [
"name" => "VILLARD Eric"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:6 [
0 => "Education"
1 => "Online exams"
2 => "Unproctored exams"
3 => "Prior warnings"
4 => "Nudges"
5 => "Randomized control trial"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-10-31 10:54:32"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100959"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "100959"
"volume" => "58"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "During the COVID-19 sanitary crisis, many exams were hastily moved to online mode. This revived a much needed debate over the privacy issues associated with online proctoring of exams, while the validity and fairness of unproctored exams were increasingly questioned. With a randomized control trial, we estimate the effectiveness of prior warnings as a means of discouraging academic dishonesty in exams. We use original, non-intrusive technologies to surreptitiously identify cheating in a series of unproctored assignments and send a targeted warning to half of the students who were identified as cheaters. We then compare their cheating behavior on the final exam with the behavior of the group of unwarned cheaters. The warning proves effective but does not completely eliminate cheating, as some students’ cheating strategies become more sophisticated following issuance of the warnings. We conclude that switching traditional exams to online mode should be accompanied by proctoring. When proctoring is not possible, credible and effective anti-cheating technologies should be deployed together with adequate warnings."
"en" => "During the COVID-19 sanitary crisis, many exams were hastily moved to online mode. This revived a much needed debate over the privacy issues associated with online proctoring of exams, while the validity and fairness of unproctored exams were increasingly questioned. With a randomized control trial, we estimate the effectiveness of prior warnings as a means of discouraging academic dishonesty in exams. We use original, non-intrusive technologies to surreptitiously identify cheating in a series of unproctored assignments and send a targeted warning to half of the students who were identified as cheaters. We then compare their cheating behavior on the final exam with the behavior of the group of unwarned cheaters. The warning proves effective but does not completely eliminate cheating, as some students’ cheating strategies become more sophisticated following issuance of the warnings. We conclude that switching traditional exams to online mode should be accompanied by proctoring. When proctoring is not possible, credible and effective anti-cheating technologies should be deployed together with adequate warnings."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
7 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2221
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14039"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14039"
"slug" => "distance-exams-can-targeted-warnings-discourage-cheating"
"yearMonth" => "2023-05"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Distance exams: Can targeted warnings discourage cheating?"
"description" => "LAMBIN, X. et HUMBERT, M. (2023). Distance exams: Can targeted warnings discourage cheating? Dans: Michelle Bergadaà, Paulo Peixoto eds. <i>Academic integrity: a call to research and action [English translation]</i>. 1st ed. Geneva: Globethics Publications, pp. 601-614."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "HUMBERT Marc"
]
]
"ouvrage" => "Academic integrity: a call to research and action [English translation]"
"keywords" => array:1 [
0 => "academic integrity"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-19 17:34:25"
"publicationUrl" => "http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/4271540"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "601-614"
"volume" => "1"
"number" => "25"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Chapitres"
"en" => "Book chapters"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Editeur"
"en" => "Publisher"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Suisse"
"en" => "Switzerland"
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "The urgency of doing complements the urgency of knowing. Urgency here is not the inconsequential injunction of irrational immediacy. It arises in various contexts for good reasons, when there is a threat to the human existence and harms to others. Today, our knowledge based civilization is at risk both by new production models of knowledge and by the shamelessness of knowledge delinquents, exposing the greatest number to important risks. Swiftly, the editors respond to the diagnostic by setting up a reference tool for academic integrity. Across multiple dialogues between the twenty-five chapters and five major themes, the ethical response shapes pragmatic horizons for action, on a range of disciplinary competencies: from science to international diplomacy. An interdisciplinary work indispensable for teachers, students and university researchers and administrators."
"en" => "The urgency of doing complements the urgency of knowing. Urgency here is not the inconsequential injunction of irrational immediacy. It arises in various contexts for good reasons, when there is a threat to the human existence and harms to others. Today, our knowledge based civilization is at risk both by new production models of knowledge and by the shamelessness of knowledge delinquents, exposing the greatest number to important risks. Swiftly, the editors respond to the diagnostic by setting up a reference tool for academic integrity. Across multiple dialogues between the twenty-five chapters and five major themes, the ethical response shapes pragmatic horizons for action, on a range of disciplinary competencies: from science to international diplomacy. An interdisciplinary work indispensable for teachers, students and university researchers and administrators."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
8 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2222
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14059"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14059"
"slug" => "artificial-intelligence-can-seemingly-collusive-outcomes-be-avoided"
"yearMonth" => "2023-09"
"year" => "2023"
"title" => "Artificial Intelligence: Can Seemingly Collusive Outcomes Be Avoided?"
"description" => "ABADA, I. et LAMBIN, X. (2023). Artificial Intelligence: Can Seemingly Collusive Outcomes Be Avoided? <i>Management Science</i>, 69(9), pp. 5042-5065."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "ABADA Ibrahim"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "machine learning – multiagent reinforcement learning"
1 => "algorithmic decision making"
2 => "tacit collusion"
3 => "decentralized power systems"
]
"updatedAt" => "2023-09-26 14:20:59"
"publicationUrl" => "https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4623"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "5042-5065"
"volume" => "69"
"number" => "9"
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Strategic decisions are increasingly delegated to algorithms. We extend previous results of the algorithmic collusion literature to the context of dynamic optimization with imperfect monitoring by analyzing a setting where a limited number of agents use simple and independent machine-learning algorithms to buy and sell a storable good. No specific instruction is given to them, only that their objective is to maximize profits based solely on past market prices and payoffs. With an original application to battery operations, we observe that the algorithms learn quickly to reach seemingly collusive decisions, despite the absence of any formal communication between them. Building on the findings of the existing literature on algorithmic collusion, we show that seeming collusion could originate in imperfect exploration rather than excessive algorithmic sophistication. We then show that a regulator may succeed in disciplining the market to produce socially desirable outcomes by enforcing decentralized learning or with adequate intervention during the learning process."
"en" => "Strategic decisions are increasingly delegated to algorithms. We extend previous results of the algorithmic collusion literature to the context of dynamic optimization with imperfect monitoring by analyzing a setting where a limited number of agents use simple and independent machine-learning algorithms to buy and sell a storable good. No specific instruction is given to them, only that their objective is to maximize profits based solely on past market prices and payoffs. With an original application to battery operations, we observe that the algorithms learn quickly to reach seemingly collusive decisions, despite the absence of any formal communication between them. Building on the findings of the existing literature on algorithmic collusion, we show that seeming collusion could originate in imperfect exploration rather than excessive algorithmic sophistication. We then show that a regulator may succeed in disciplining the market to produce socially desirable outcomes by enforcing decentralized learning or with adequate intervention during the learning process."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
9 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2223
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14139"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14139"
"slug" => "algorithmic-explainability-and-obfuscation-under-regulatory-audits"
"yearMonth" => "2022-06"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Algorithmic Explainability and Obfuscation under Regulatory Audits"
"description" => "LAMBIN, X. et RAIZONVILLE, A. (2022). Algorithmic Explainability and Obfuscation under Regulatory Audits. Dans: XI Workshop on Institutions, Individual Behaviour and Economic Outcomes 2022. Alghero."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "RAIZONVILLE A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "XI Workshop on Institutions, Individual Behaviour and Economic Outcomes 2022"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-20 01:00:38"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
10 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2224
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14140"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14140"
"slug" => "algorithmic-explainability-and-obfuscation-under-regulatory-audits"
"yearMonth" => "2022-05"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "Algorithmic Explainability and Obfuscation under Regulatory Audits"
"description" => "LAMBIN, X. et RAIZONVILLE, A. (2022). Algorithmic Explainability and Obfuscation under Regulatory Audits. Dans: 20th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2022. Boston."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "RAIZONVILLE A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "20th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference 2022"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-20 01:00:38"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
11 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2225
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14149"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14149"
"slug" => "from-black-box-to-glass-box-algorithmic-explainability-as-a-strategic-decision"
"yearMonth" => "2022-10"
"year" => "2022"
"title" => "From black box to glass box: algorithmic explainability as a strategic decision"
"description" => "LAMBIN, X. et RAIZONVILLE, A. (2022). From black box to glass box: algorithmic explainability as a strategic decision. Dans: 2022 Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) Annual Conference. Rethimno."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "RAIZONVILLE A."
]
]
"ouvrage" => "2022 Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists (ASSET) Annual Conference"
"keywords" => []
"updatedAt" => "2023-07-20 16:49:13"
"publicationUrl" => null
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => ""
"volume" => ""
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Communications dans une conférence"
"en" => "Presentations at an Academic or Professional conference"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => ""
"en" => ""
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
12 => Essec\Faculty\Model\Contribution {#2226
#_index: "academ_contributions"
#_id: "14771"
#_source: array:18 [
"id" => "14771"
"slug" => "on-algorithmic-collusion-and-reward-punishment-schemes"
"yearMonth" => "2024-04"
"year" => "2024"
"title" => "On algorithmic collusion and reward–punishment schemes"
"description" => "EPIVENT, A. et LAMBIN, X. (2024). On algorithmic collusion and reward–punishment schemes. <i>Economics Letters</i>, 237, pp. 111661."
"authors" => array:2 [
0 => array:3 [
"name" => "LAMBIN Xavier"
"bid" => "B00791770"
"slug" => "lambin-xavier"
]
1 => array:1 [
"name" => "EPIVENT Andréa"
]
]
"ouvrage" => ""
"keywords" => array:4 [
0 => "Machine learning"
1 => "Multi-agent reinforcement learning"
2 => "Algorithmic decision-making"
3 => "Tacit collusion"
]
"updatedAt" => "2024-04-04 12:46:21"
"publicationUrl" => "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524001447"
"publicationInfo" => array:3 [
"pages" => "111661"
"volume" => "237"
"number" => ""
]
"type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Articles"
"en" => "Journal articles"
]
"support_type" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Revue scientifique"
"en" => "Scientific journal"
]
"countries" => array:2 [
"fr" => null
"en" => null
]
"abstract" => array:2 [
"fr" => "A booming literature describes how artificial intelligence algorithms may autonomously learn to generate supra-competitive profits. The widespread interpretation of this phenomenon as “collusion” is based largely on the observation that one agent’s unilateral price cuts are followed by several periods of low prices and profits for both agents, which is construed as the signature of a reward–punishment scheme. We observe that price hikes are also followed by aggressive price wars. Algorithms may also converge to outcomes that are worse than Nash and penalize deviations from it. While admissible in equilibrium, this behavior throws interesting light on the relationship between high algorithmic prices and the standard mechanisms behind (human) collusion."
"en" => "A booming literature describes how artificial intelligence algorithms may autonomously learn to generate supra-competitive profits. The widespread interpretation of this phenomenon as “collusion” is based largely on the observation that one agent’s unilateral price cuts are followed by several periods of low prices and profits for both agents, which is construed as the signature of a reward–punishment scheme. We observe that price hikes are also followed by aggressive price wars. Algorithms may also converge to outcomes that are worse than Nash and penalize deviations from it. While admissible in equilibrium, this behavior throws interesting light on the relationship between high algorithmic prices and the standard mechanisms behind (human) collusion."
]
"authors_fields" => array:2 [
"fr" => "Economie"
"en" => "Economics"
]
"indexedAt" => "2024-04-28T11:21:50.000Z"
]
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 6.6462245
+"parent": null
}
]
"avatar" => "https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00791770.jpg"
"contributionCounts" => 13
"personalLinks" => array:2 [
0 => "<a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4664-726X" target="_blank">ORCID</a>"
1 => "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rvaYU_UAAAAJ&hl=fr" target="_blank">Google scholar</a>"
]
"docTitle" => "Xavier LAMBIN"
"docSubtitle" => "Professeur assistant"
"docDescription" => "Département: Economie<br>Campus de Cergy"
"docType" => "cv"
"docPreview" => "<img src="https://faculty.essec.edu/wp-content/uploads/avatars/B00791770.jpg"><span><span>Xavier LAMBIN</span><span>B00791770</span></span>"
]
#_index: "academ_cv"
+lang: "fr"
+"_type": "_doc"
+"_score": 4.922411
+"parent": null
}
